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Theses
1. Since the economic crisis in 2008, the process by which the 
balance of power in Russian-Chinese relations has changed to 
the benefit of China has gained significant momentum. This 
has been evident on the bilateral, regional and global levels. 
The dynamics of change will remain unfavourable to Russia, 
because China’s potential and international position will not 
stop growing, while the growth of Russia’s international posi-
tion has slowed down. This new balance of power has shaped 
the background for the Russian debate on China, and marks 
a new stage in this debate. 
2. It is a commonly shared view in Russian public debate that 
China is an exemplary model of a successful transformation 
and a potential superpower. Sceptical opinions about the sus-
tainability of the growth of China’s position are rare. At the 
same time, it is envisaged that, in the emerging post-Ameri-
can international order, China will become one of the few key 
players in the new ‘concert of powers’ as well as in the new 
global governance formats, such as the G-20. In turn, the for-
mula of Chinese-US leadership (the so-called ‘G-2’) is seen as 
a rather unlikely scenario, still less the international arena 
being dominated by China alone. 
3. Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree 
in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian- 
-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequali-
ty between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position 
as compared to China. However, supporters of co-operation 
with China are playing down the existing political differenc-
es. In turn, interpretations of the economic challenges, which 
are mainly linked to the existing model of economic relations, 
are similar. Much more disagreement can be found in the de-
bate concerning the future of Russian-Chinese relations. 
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4. Those who share the optimistic view want close co-operation 
with China to be continued. They see such co-operation as an 
opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of 
Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy. China’s development 
is not seen as a threat; it is opening up the way for diversifi-
cation of oil and gas sales and is leading to the emergence of 
a source of loans, technologies and an example of modernisa-
tion which poses an alternative to the West. International co-
operation with China is seen as an opportunity for Russia to 
avoid unilateral dependence on the West. At the same time, 
even supporters of close co-operation with China do not want 
a political and military alliance with it – this is no longer seen 
as a possible option in relations with China. 
5. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China 
through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing im-
balance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is 
the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as 
neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier 
of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evalu-
ated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination 
of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over 
the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that 
Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and 
search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom 
could counterbalance the Chinese influence. 
6. The public debate on China in Russia has had little influence on 
the government’s policy in this area. The Kremlin seems to share 
the more optimistic view, and is continuing the process of estab-
lishing closer relations with China. In practice this means that 
Russia will oppose any attempts to involve it with any forms of co-
operation which could be determined as anti-Chinese. However 
on the other hand, the increasing imbalance in Russian-Chinese 
relations will make it more and more difficult for Moscow to play 
the ‘Chinese card’ in its policy towards the West. 
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InTroducTIon
The purpose of this work is to present the key trends in the Rus-
sian debate on China. This debate, which has been ongoing since 
the collapse of the USSR, runs at several levels which permeate 
one another: the official political discourse, the political discus-
sion in the media, and the public debate on Internet forums. The 
key participants who are shaping this debate include politicians, 
from the governing camp and from the opposition; experts from 
analytical centres and academic institutions; lobbyists repre-
senting the interests of state-controlled and private structures 
(such as the army, the secret services, business, etc.); the press 
and electronic media, and popular Internet commentators. The 
contribution of each of the actors to the debate is uneven, as is 
their impact on the state’s real policy, which makes the analy-
sis quite difficult. The most active are the experts and the me-
dia, although their impact on the decisions taken at the Kremlin 
is limited. Influential lobbyists, especially in business circles, 
rarely participate in public discussion. In turn, the declarations 
made by politicians are usually dependent on tactical needs, and 
must be treated with great caution. The nature of the Russian 
political system is another limitation; the decision-making pro-
cess within it is non-transparent, which seriously reduces the 
significance of public debate. 
2008 has been chosen as the starting point for the presentation 
of the Russian debate on China. It was in that year that the previ-
ously observed growth in Russia’s international position slowed 
down, while gaining momentum in the case of China. This led to 
a major change of balance in Russian-Chinese relations, which 
necessarily had a certain impact on the content of the debate. 
The first part presents the background to the debate, the key 
changes which have taken place on Russian-Chinese relations 
since 2008. The next chapters describe selected aspects of the Rus-
sian debate: the evaluation of the increase in China’s significance, 
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the evaluation of the new balance of power in bilateral relations, 
and visions for the development of Russian-Chinese relations. The 
last section contains an analysis of the Russian debate’s impact on 
Russia’s perception of and policy towards the West. 
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I. The background To The debaTe: chIna’s 
IncreasIngly sTrong posITIon and The 
evoluTIon of russIan-chInese relaTIons
The past decade, especially the period following the global fi-
nancial crisis of 2008, has brought about a deep transformation 
of Russian-Chinese relations. The balance of power has changed 
in China’s favour at every level of relations: bilateral, regional 
and global. The change became even more evident since, after 
a period when the international position of each country had 
been rising at a similar rate (as manifested in the term ‘emerg-
ing powers’, which was used with regard to both of them, and in 
the BRIC concept), a new trend became apparent: Russia’s inter-
national position ceased to improve, even though it was not ac-
tually deteriorating. Meanwhile, China accelerated the process 
of becoming the second strongest superpower, and significantly 
reduced the distance between itself and the United States. The 
disproportions in the indicators of the two countries’ economic 
power became striking. In 2009, the Chinese economy grew by 
8.5%, while Russia’s GDP fell by 7.5%. Over the next two years, 
the Chinese economy grew twice as fast as Russia’s, and so the 
distance between them increased further. In 2011, Russia’s GDP 
reached US$1.85 trillion, while China’s stood at almost US$7.3 
trillion. Chinese military expenses were double the size of Rus-
sia’s in 2010. Since 2008, a slight (albeit irregular) surplus has 
been seen in Russia’s trade with China; raw materials form a vast 
part of Russian exports. 
In bilateral relations, the most evident manifestation of the change 
in the balance of power is China’s increasing ability to force its 
own agenda upon Russia. For Moscow, the geopolitical dimension 
and the ability to use co-operation with China as a counterweight 
to the West, especially the United States, is of crucial importance. 
Beijing’s most important goals include the maintaining of the ‘stra-
tegic peace’ and the economisation of relations, including access to 
Russia’s raw materials and market. As a consequence, China has 
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emphasised on numerous occasions that it does not intend to trans-
form its political co-operation with Russia into a political and mili-
tary alliance, and that economic relations are of key significance. 
The signing of the regional co-operation agreement in Russia’s 
Far East in 2009 (which. However, has not been implemented on 
a regular basis, due to resistance from Moscow), and the launch of 
a branch of the ESPO oil pipeline running to China in 2010, can be 
seen as symbols of the success of the Chinese approach. 
As regards the regional dimension, the changes in Russian-
-Chinese relations have been manifested most strongly in Central 
Asia. China broke the Russian monopoly on transit of hydrocar-
bons from this region when it launched an oil pipeline from Ka-
zakhstan in 2006 and a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan in 2009. 
Thus Russia has been deprived of a very important instrument 
of pressure on these countries. In the first decade of this century, 
Chinese energy companies have outpaced Russian companies in 
gaining access to oil and gas resources in the region. In 2010, the 
trade volume between the Central Asian countries and China 
was higher than their trade volume with Russia. Furthermore, 
Turkmenistan received a loan from China in 2009, and thus was 
able to survive its ‘gas war’ with Russia1. As regards the Shang-
hai Co-operation Organisation, Chinese concepts (focusing on 
economic issues and an unwillingness to build an anti-Western 
geopolitical bloc) have also prevailed over Russia’s (developing 
a geopolitical profile of this organisation that would extend be-
yond the region). China’s presence can also be noticed in other 
parts of the post-Soviet area, including Belarus and Ukraine. Al-
though this has so far been purely an economic presence, it has 
nevertheless had political consequences, because these coun-
tries have developed a stronger negotiating position in dealings 
with Russia. 
1 In 2009, Russia refused to accept supplies of gas from Turkmenistan, thus 
attempting to force Ashgabat to change the conditions of the contract (pric-
es and the quantities of gas it purchased. 
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In the global dimension, the growth of China’s international 
position has contributed to a shrinking of Russia’s role. In eco-
nomic terms, China is already a superpower (and the world’s 
second largest economy). Meanwhile, Russia is lagging far be-
hind, something which is only partly compensated for by its oil 
and gas supplies to global markets. In 2010, the decision was 
taken to increase China’s share in the World Bank group from 
2.78% to 4.12%, while Russia could consider itself very fortunate 
to maintain its share at the pre-existing level of 2.78%. A sym-
bolic expression of these changes is China’s growing significance 
in the developing world, and the emergence of the ‘Beijing Con-
sensus’ as an alternative model of socio-economic development. 
Russia cannot show any real achievements in this area. There 
is also a clearly noticeable difference between the ‘soft power’ 
potentials of these two countries. In Moscow’s case, this does not 
reach beyond the post-Soviet area, while China is increasingly 
effectively building up and using the non-material aspects of its 
power, not only in its immediate surroundings but also in very 
distant regions. 
Given their scale and far-reaching consequences, the changes in 
the Russian-Chinese balance of power had to affect the Russian 
debate concerning China. The future of China as a potential su-
perpower and the consequences of its new international position 
for Russia have become key issues in this debate. 
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II. The russIan evaluaTIon of chIna’s rIse 
The image of contemporary China in Russian debate has primar-
ily been shaped by experts and the media; other major actors have 
become involved only intermittently. Two elements predominate 
in the image of China: the perception of its development as the 
success of its rational policy and successful economic transforma-
tion, and the belief that it is an emerging superpower. 
1. China as an example of success
China is seen as an example of the effectiveness of a rational eco-
nomic policy and of a transition from a symbol of poverty and 
backwardness to a model of success. The history of China’s devel-
opment over the past twenty years provides a alternative to the 
Western model of socio-economic development. An optimistic, 
not to say enthusiastic, approach to the scale of Chinese success 
predominates among most of the participants in this debate.
Supporters of President Vladimir Putin present China as an exam-
ple of a political system partly because of the procedure whereby 
the elite is reshuffled while the continuity of power is preserved. 
Some authors have drawn parallels between United Russia and 
the Communist Party of China2. China is used as an example by 
those who believe that ‘authoritarian modernisation’ is possible3. 
The peaceful process of handing over power to the next genera-
tion of Chinese leaders, despite tensions existing inside the Chi-
nese elites, has reinforced the view that China’s political system 
is flexible. 
2 Sergei Luzyanin, ‘Yedinorossy uchatsia u kommunistov Kitaya rukovodit 
stranoi’, http://www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/document147345.phtml; Ser-
gei Luzyanin, ‘Odna iz prichin uspekha Kitaya – preyemstvennost vlasti’, Ra-
dio Golos Rossii, 5 February 2010, http://rus.ruvr.ru/2010/02/05/4174017.html 
3 The idea of authoritarian modernisation is also critically evaluated in Bobo 
Lo, Lilia Shevtsova, A 21st Century Myth – Authoritarian Modernization in Rus-
sia and China, Carnegie Moscow 2012.
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In turn, those experts and politicians who are in opposition to the 
Kremlin set the success of Chinese policy against Russia’s difficult 
and ultimately quite unfruitful transformation since the collapse 
of the USSR. They emphasise the distance between the Chinese 
and Russian achievements – the Chinese elites have been pursu-
ing better policies, as a result of which Russia has become a coun-
try with a primitive economy, and is underdeveloped in compari-
son to China. China has shown that reforms can be coupled with 
improving people’s living standards. It has successfully carried 
through economic transformation under state control, and thus 
secured both internal interests and the interests of foreign inves-
tors, which Russia has not been capable of over the past ten years4.
Great fascination with China’s achievements predominates in 
Russian debate. However, this has not been accompanied by criti-
cal reflection. This positive image of China is simultaneously be-
ing used for internal political goals by both supporters and oppo-
nents of Vladimir Putin’s regime. For the former, it is a model to 
be copied and a way to legitimise the continuity of the Russian 
government as a source of potential success. The latter use it to 
discredit the system Putin created as totally inefficient and inca-
pable of conducting the modernisation process. 
Most participants in the discussion agree in their evaluation of 
China and its political and economic potential. What stands out 
against this background is a dispute, primarily among Russian 
experts, concerning the evaluation of the Chinese armed forces. 
On the one hand, it is forecast that within a timeframe of 15 to 20 
years, China will be able to outpace all other countries (with the 
exception of the USA) in terms of military potential, and become 
4 ‘Eto uzhe ne anekdot’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 August 2011, http://www.
ng.ru/editorial/2011-08-11/2_red.html;
 Rossiysko-kitaiskiy seminar: Rossiya i Kitai v novoi mezhdunarodnoi srede, 
20-22 March 2009, RIA Novosti, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/event/n_13724; 
Aleksandr Lomanov, ‘Kaltsiy dla kommunistov’, Rossiya v globalnoi politike’, 
6/2012.
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the second superpower. On the other hand, there is disagreement 
over the technical potential of the Chinese arms industry. The 
launch of China’s first aircraft carrier was regarded as a manifes-
tation of national pride, rather than a move which could change 
the balance of power in the region. In turn, China’s presentation 
of a prototype of a fifth-generation multi-task aircraft has been 
seen as proof that this country is capable of achieving a techno-
logical breakthrough within the next 5 to 15 years, in contrast to 
Russia5. Few Russian analysts contest the durability of the pre-
sent Chinese model of political and economic development. The 
problems they mention which could potentially pose a threat to 
the growth of China’s position include the undemocratic political 
system, its excessively large population, a shortage of energy raw 
materials, and ecological problems6.
2. China as an emerging superpower 
The positive evaluations of China’s development in the past dec-
ade have influenced Russian assessments of China’s position on 
the international stage and of its foreign policy. In this case too, 
experts and the media are setting the tone of the debate. Politi-
cians have mainly restricted themselves to diplomatic compli-
ments, and have avoided evaluating China’s international activity. 
Experts participating in the Russian debate agree that China is an 
emerging superpower which is gradually becoming a global lead-
er. Judging from the statements of Russian leaders, they share this 
opinion, although the Russian government has avoided using the 
term ‘superpower’. China is usually referred to simply as a pow-
er, and a country without which no major political or economic 
5 Arbatov, ‘Upravleniye bezopasnosti’, Moscow 2010; China’s new aircraft car-
rier no threat to power balance: Russian expert, English news cn, 10 August 
2011; US concern over China's technology proves well-founded - Russian ex-
pert, Interfax-AVN [in:] Johnson’s Russia List, 2011-#11, 17 January 2011.
6 Rossiysko-kitaiskiy seminar..., op.cit.: Alexandr Lukin, ‘Tsena voprosa’, 
Kommersant, 15 March 2011; http://ru-sps.livejournal.com/777658.html
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problem can be resolved. However, many of these statements can 
be treated as expressions of courtesy addressed to an important 
partner, and as such, do not precisely reflect their real beliefs7.
China’s present foreign policy is perceived first of all as pragmat-
ic, and aimed primarily at serving the goals of economic develop-
ment. It is also sometimes seen as failing to exploit all its possi-
bilities and potential fully. Russian experts also note that China is 
positioning itself as a country which shows no ambition to become 
a superpower, and is searching for ‘harmonious relations’ with 
the international community. Such opinions are especially pre-
dominant in academic circles and among researchers from insti-
tutions focused on China. Experts who are not so closely linked to 
China are not so optimistic, but they also see the Chinese foreign 
policy as moderate and non-aggressive. At the same time, Chinese 
economic expansion, especially in developing countries, has been 
noted. However, the predominant view is that Beijing is taking 
great care to be cautious in its activity; focusing on economic tools 
and soft power; and avoiding excessive political engagement, in-
cluding in the internal affairs of other countries8. Experts linked 
to the opposition also indicate that Russia could learn from China 
about the right way to conduct foreign policy: less conceit and an-
nouncing its imperial intentions to all and sundry, less verbosity, 
building up practical influence instead of announcing ‘zones of 
7 ‘Eto uzhe ne anekdot’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 August 2011; ‘Bez ideologic-
zeskikh dogm, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 July 2011; Sergei Luzyanin, China-
-Russia Treaty: a powerful political tool, 20 June 2011; Igor Novikov, ‘Geografiya 
i politika’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 August 2010; Sergei Shelin, ‘Sverkhderzhavnyi 
sosed’, Gazeta.ru, 12 October 2011; Aleksandr Gabuyev, ‘Piatiletka kachestva 
zhizni’, Kommersant, 15 March 2011; Dmitri Trenin, ‘True partners. How Rus-
sia and China see each other’, London: Centre for European Reform 2012, page 
43; TassNews, 4 August 2011, Interfax-Military, 25 April 2011.
8 ‘China play positive role in world: Russian expert’, 13 March 2010; Mikhail 
Margelov in ‘Russia Must Use Oil As Foreign Policy Tool – President’s Envoy’, 
Interfax, 17 November 2011, in Johnson’s Russia List 2011-210-33.
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privileged interests’ – in other words, more modesty in its rheto-
ric and less belligerence and demonstration of force9.
Relations between Beijing and Washington are seen as the most 
important aspect of China’s foreign policy. Russian experts agree 
that the USA, which is at the same time an economic partner and 
a political rival, is much more important for China than all the 
other countries (such as for example Russia or the EU) and pro-
jects (such as BRICS). China’s involvement in the creation of new 
international structures (RIC, BRIC and SCO) and its degree of en-
gagement in relations with other partners is thus strictly limited, 
due to this mutual dependence with the United States. 
China’s place in the international order is seen as a result of its 
potential and rapid growth. This growth also counterbalances the 
US’s dominant position and leads to more balance in the world. 
The greatest challenge is considered to be the speed of political, 
economic and military change of China, which may make it more 
difficult for the existing international order to adapt itself to an 
actor who is growing at such a rapid rate. There is a commonly 
shared opinion that the tension existing between the US and Chi-
na, and their rivalry for leadership in Asia, is especially likely to 
easily trigger a destabilisation of the international order on both 
the regional and global scales10. 
Although China is perceived as a future superpower, variants 
of Chinese leadership on the global scale, or some kind of US-
-Chinese condominium (the so-called ‘G-2’), are treated as rather 
unrealistic. The G-2 concept is also seen as a closed book because, 
9 Arbatov, op.cit.
10 Sergei Luzyanin, ‘Kto i kuda vedyot BRIK?’, 18 April 2010, http://www.mgi-
mo.ru/news/experts/document150578.phtml; ‘Regional Stability through 
Harmonious Development: Russia and China in the New Global Architec-
ture. Discussion points for the Russian-Chinese section of the Valdai Dis-
cussion Club’; contributors: S. Karaganov, O. Barabanov, T. Bordachyov, 
A. Likhachyova, I. Makarov, A. Savelyeva 2010, p. 6.
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in the opinion of Russian experts, China has clearly rejected the 
US proposal. It is believed that one key reason for China’s rejection 
of this concept is its unwillingness to play the role of the ‘younger 
brother’, a position which it deems unacceptable. 
As a consequence, what is seen in the Russian debate as the most 
likely scenario for the evolution of the future international order 
is a new ‘concert of powers’, where China will be one of the key 
players. In the opinion of Russian experts, China will gradually 
adopt the position of a ‘responsible power’, and will participate 
more and more actively in shaping the international order. 
At the same time, Beijing is perceived as a future leader of the non-
Western world, as has been reflected, for example, in the Russian 
discussion on BRICS. China is seen as the predominant actor in 
this group. As regards Russia, its very membership is being ques-
tioned, especially by those experts who oppose the government. 
China’s strong position in BRICS is also treated as something nat-
ural partly because Beijing has the broadest vision for the BRICS 
agenda, starting from the renewal of international financial ar-
chitecture, through protecting the interests of developing coun-
tries, up to security issues in the broadest meaning of the term 
(covering energy and food security), and the problem of climate 
change11.
11 Trenin, ‘True partners…’, p.10; ‘Regional Stability…’, op.cit., p. 7; ‘Rossiysko-
-kitaiskiy seminar:...’, op.cit.; Yuri Tavrovsky, ‘Konfutsiyu ne podkhodit 
khizhina diadi Toma’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 February 2010; ‘Kto i kuda 
vedyot BRIK?’, 18 April 2010; http://www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/docu-
ment150578.phtml
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III. The russIan percepTIon of russIa-chIna 
relaTIons
The image of China as an emerging superpower is accompanied in 
the Russian debate by the awareness of the scale of changes which 
have taken place in relations between the two countries over the 
past decade. A dramatic reversal of their roles has happened: for 
the first time in several centuries, Moscow may no longer see 
China as a less developed, isolated and militarily weaker state. 
It is China that has grown stronger than Russia in many respects. 
As a consequence, the belief that Russia is unable to gain a super-
power status equal to China’s is increasingly gaining in strength. 
Above all, participants in the debate disagree in their evaluation 
of the degree to which the new situation is a result of the Krem-
lin’s policy, and how much it is an effect of factors beyond its con-
trol. The differences of opinions outlined in this part of the work 
will become greater in the debate on possible scenarios for the de-
velopment of bilateral relations. 
1. The political dimension: minimising the conflicts 
of interests
Regardless of the changes taking place in the balance of power be-
tween Moscow and Beijing, the political message from the Krem-
lin remains clear: Russia is not afraid of China’s growing power. 
This viewpoint has been expressed most explicitly by Vladimir 
Putin, who has made several announcements to this effect. He 
has stated that Russia does not fear China, despite warnings from 
Western experts and the differences of interests existing between 
the two countries12. Optimism in viewing Russian-Chinese co-op-
eration has become the correct approach at the official level. One 
expression of this is the regular emphasising that relations be-
tween these two countries are “the best in history”. The Kremlin’s 
12 ‘HIGHLIGHTS: Russia’s Putin on 2012, China, Ukraine’, Johnson’s Russia List 
170-2010, #4, 7 September 2010.
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stance has affected the Russian media’s attitude towards China; 
the number of publications on the ‘Chinese threat’ in the media 
has fallen in comparison to the beginning of the decade13. Simi-
larly, representatives of regional governments are also more re-
luctant to criticise China. 
The government’s stance is backed by a large group of experts, 
primarily those linked to analytical centres which are believed to 
co-operate closely with the Kremlin, and to academic institutions 
involved in Chinese studies. The view that China and Russia share 
a broad community of interests, which minimises the inevitable 
disagreements, predominates in the evaluation of bilateral rela-
tions. It is indicated that China has demonstrated a constructive 
approach to Russia, including in such sensitive areas as borders, 
migration and trade. Russian-Chinese co-operation is seen as an 
example of durable, friendly relations in the modern world, and 
a refutation of the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory. The shared ap-
proach to the history of World War II and the return of the memo-
ry of common struggle against Japan have been evaluated in very 
positive terms14. 
It is characteristic of this trend in the debate, which positively 
evaluates political relations, to minimise any conflicts of interests 
and to see any ‘bones of contention’ as de facto inessential from 
the perspective of the two countries. One example is the list of 
contentious issues presented by one of the most ‘pro-Chinese’ ex-
perts: China’s unwillingness to join any agreements on arms con-
trol or reduction of intermediate range missiles; disinterest in the 
unification of Korea; lack of support for Russia regarding Abkha-
zia and Southern Ossetia; genuine interest in trade liberalisation, 
as a consequence of which China has moved closer to the West 
13 Aleksandr Larin, ‘Kitayskiye migranty glazami Rossiyan’, Demoscope Week-
ly, No. 333-334, 2008, http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0333/tema01.php 
14 Aleksandr Larin, ‘Rossiysko-kitaiskiye otnosheniya: ne oslablyat usiliy’, 
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, no. 11/2009; Sergei Luzyanin, http://www.mgimo.
ru/news/experts/document152447.phtml; ‘Regional Stability...’, op.cit., p. 5.
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than to Russia, which is protecting its own market; and competi-
tion in attracting foreign investments and developing its frontier 
regions15. In this way, the experts can avoid expressing opinions 
on much more complex issues in bilateral relations, such as dif-
ficulties in energy co-operation, rivalry in Central Asia, the unfa-
vourable nature of economic relations for Russia, and Chinese im-
migration to Russia. While downplaying the existing differences, 
even pro-government experts in Russia indicate that there is still 
too little trust and understanding in mutual relations. Tendencies 
to underrate the differences of interests and emphasise the two 
countries’ ability to compromise can also be noticed in Russian 
experts’ opinions on China’s expansion in Central Asia. Accord-
ing to most of them, there is no rivalry between Moscow and Bei-
jing in this region. The two countries have been able to avoid con-
flict despite their competing interests. Moscow has not blocked 
China’s entry into the region, and Beijing has been behaving in 
such a manner so as not to ‘hurt’ Russia’s imperial feelings. It has 
been recognised that Central Asia is a region where the Kremlin 
must ‘share’ its influence; that is, not all pipelines from this re-
gion must run through Russian territory and be under Russian 
control. As a consequence, China is seen as an important regional 
partner, and not just as Russia’s rival16. Against the background 
of these evaluations of Russian-Chinese political relations, some 
individual critical voices can be heard. These include representa-
tives of the Russian Armed Forces (General Anatoly Kulikov, pres-
ident of the Club of Military Commanders of the Russian Federa-
tion), who has pointed out that China is competing with Russia in 
the international arena, especially in the post-Soviet area17, and 
also globally. Fleet Commander Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky has 
warned that China is increasingly interested in having a presence 
15 Larin, ‘Rossiysko-kitaiskiye otnosheniya...’, op.cit.
16 Dmitri Trenin, ‘Postimperium. A Eurasian Story’, Washington, DC: Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace 2011, p. 135; Larin, ‘Rossiysko-
-kitaiskiye otnosheniya...’; ‘Rossiysko-kitaiskiy seminar...’, op.cit.
17 Interfax, 24 October 2009.
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in the Arctic, and could pose a challenge to Russian interests in 
this region18. However, these have so far been just isolated opin-
ions, and have failed to provoke any broader discussion. They also 
contained elements of lobbying for the given agency, or the armed 
forces as a whole. 
The evaluation of the military balance of power between Russia 
and China is the most controversial part of the debate. Assuranc-
es from Russian government representatives that their nuclear 
arsenal provides a kind of security guarantee to Russia, should 
China change its foreign policy and choose expansion, suggest 
that Moscow fears Chinese conventional forces. In the opinion of 
the defence minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, China will not be able 
to match Russia in terms of nuclear potential19. In turn, accord-
ing to the commander-in-chief of the ground troops, Aleksandr 
Postnikov, Russian weapons are inferior not only to the technolo-
gies used by the armed forces of NATO member states but also to 
those the Chinese armed forces have at their disposal. However, 
his statement may be seen as an attempt at lobbying, and has not 
sparked a broader debate20. Experts differ in their evaluations of 
the Russian-Chinese balance of power; however, the view that 
Chinese conventional forces are superior to Russian ones is be-
coming increasingly popular21. The Chinese military potential 
gives rise to anxiety especially among analysts who are in opposi-
tion to the government. In their opinion, China will have a great-
er military potential than Russia on its eastern frontier. China’s 
military manoeuvres in 2006 and 2009 were interpreted as dem-
onstrations of its readiness to launch a potential large-scale land 
offensive against Russia. 
18 Tass-News, 4 October 2010.
19 Interfax-AVN, 24 December 2010.
20 Sergei Balmasov, ‘Rossiyskoye oruzhiye khuzhe kitaiskogo?’, 16 March 2011, 
www.pravda.ru
21 Trenin, ‘True partners…’, p. 8.
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2. The economic dimension: the unfavourable structure 
of relations
The diagnosis of the condition of present Russian-Chinese eco-
nomic relations raises no controversies in Russian debate22. The 
simple fact of developing economic relations with China is broad-
ly acceptable. However, practically all participants in the debate 
have criticised the structure of the economic relations between 
the two countries. Russian government representatives, includ-
ing Vladimir Putin himself, have on numerous occasions ex-
pressed their dissatisfaction with the existing model of economic 
relations, as well as the need to change it. Here the experts and the 
media are in total agreement with the stance officially presented 
by the government. The greatest problems mentioned include the 
predominance of raw materials in Russian exports; the very low 
share of manufactured heavy equipment in trade; and the Rus-
sian trade deficit (which occurred in 2008 and 2010). It is com-
monly believed that the investment structure is unfavourable to 
Russia, because its main element consists of Chinese investments 
in Russian primary economic sectors and in companies operating 
in the frontier regions, whose products (especially raw materials 
and semi-finished products) are then sold to China23.
Disputes in the Russian debate concern the significance of the 
problems outlined above within the broader context of Russian-
-Chinese relations. Three major trends of opinion can be distin-
guished. 
22 Trenin, ‘Postimperium…’, pp. 134-135; idem, ‘True partners…’, pp. 1 and 7.
23 A similar opinion was expressed among others by the then advisor to Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin, Anatoly Ushakov. Before Putin’s visit to China, 
Ushakov determined that the trade structure was unsatisfactory. See: Ly-
ubov Pronina, Henry Meyer, ‘Russia Seeks to Diversify Trade With China 
During Putin’s Trip’, Bloomberg, 10 October 2011 [in:] Johnson’s Russia List 
2011-182-28; Arbatov, op.cit.; ‘Regional Stability through Harmonious De-
velopment…’, op.cit., pp. 8-9. Vlad Grinkevich, ‘Rossiya i Kitay: neftianaya 
druzhba’, AN RIA Nowosti, 22 June 2009.
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In the opinion of the government and those experts who view 
the development of relations with China favourably, these prob-
lems are temporary and should not be exaggerated. Supporters of 
building closer relations with China have recognised the co-op-
eration agreements signed by the neighbouring provinces of the 
two countries in 2009 and the construction of the ESPO oil pipe-
line branch running to China as breakthrough events. In particu-
lar the latter investment, which went through owing to Chinese 
loans, was treated as proof that Russia had already made a turn 
towards China in its energy policy. Senior government officials 
(including the then prime minister, Vladimir Putin, and deputy 
prime minister, Igor Sechin) became involved in promoting this 
project. These two politicians recognised that the agreement with 
China concerning the construction of the ESPO branch and the 
oil supply contract were ‘fair’24. Energy co-operation, as they said, 
was the implementation of the strategic task of diversifying ex-
ports of Russian raw materials. 
Many experts who are critical of the existing model of economic 
co-operation claim that these problems are characteristic of the 
Russian economy as a whole, and not all of them result from Chi-
nese policy, but rather from Russia’s general weakness25. As a con-
sequence, they also relativise the importance of the structure of 
economic relations, which is unfavourable to Russia. 
Critics of rapprochement with China, especially those who are 
in opposition to the Kremlin, see economic relations as the most 
important element of the new balance of power, which in their 
opinion is very unfavourable to Russia. The pivotal issue in their 
24 Andrei Piontkovsky, ‘Kitainoye stalo yavnym’, 11 January 2010, http://grani.
ru/opinion/piontkovsky/m.173037.html; Sergei Razov, ‘Pragmatizm vmes-
to pretenzyi i nedoveriya’, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 11/2009; ‘Kitai delayet 
iz Rossii koloniyu’, New Russia News Agency, 7 July 2010, http://www.nr2.
ru/rus/290847.html; Nataliya Alyakrinskaya, Dmitri Loginov, ‘Bratya po 
trube’, The New Times, No. 37, 23 October 2009.
25 Larin, ‘Rossiysko-kitaiskiye otnosheniya…’, op.cit.
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criticism is the degree to which Russian exports to China are dom-
inated by raw materials: oil & gas, metal ores and wood. This is 
coupled with the lack of major investments in the secondary sec-
tor of the economy (China processes the raw materials on its own 
territory, and brings its own labour force to its investments in 
Russia). Thus Chinese engagement is referred to as ‘colonisation’, 
as a result of which Russia is being turned into a ‘source of raw 
materials’ for China. The condition of Russian-Chinese energy 
co-operation is evaluated especially negatively. It is seen as inher-
ently resulting in dependence on the importer, who as a monopoly 
will be able to dictate the prices to a much greater extent than is 
the case with the EU. Some experts and sections of the media see 
the plans to build a gas pipeline to China in a similar way. The 
most severe criticism was sparked by the contract to construct 
the ESPO pipeline; it was estimated that the 20-year contract for 
300 million tonnes of oil for US$100 billion came out at the price of 
US$50-57 per barrel. As a consequence, this contract was branded 
as the first stage of turning Russia into China’s raw material base. 
Another event which strengthened the view that Russia is becom-
ing merely a source of raw materials for China was the regional 
co-operation agreement signed in 2009; according to critics, it 
was based on the principle ‘our raw materials – your technolo-
gies’26. Plans to lease arable land to Chinese companies have also 
come in for criticism.
26 ‘Rossiya ne spravitsya’, Vedomosti, 12 October 2009; Arbatov, op.cit.; 
Alyakrinskaya, Loginov, op.cit.
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Iv. The fuTure of russIan-chInese 
relaTIons
There can be no doubt that both China’s becoming a superpow-
er and the new balance of power in bilateral relations will have 
far-reaching consequences for Russia. Therefore, the debate has 
been dominated by two trends: optimism and pessimism. Accord-
ing to the optimists, close contacts with China will trigger socio-
economic development in Russia itself, and will increase Russia’s 
room for manoeuvre in the international arena. In turn, the pes-
simists fear that increasingly close relations with China will de-
prive Russia of autonomy in foreign policy, and make Russian in-
terests subordinate to those of China. 
1. The optimistic vision: China as an indispensable 
partner
The optimistic vision stems from the positive perception of Chi-
na’s development among Russian leaders. Although we should be 
sceptical about such declarations (especially given the changes 
in the balance of power, which are unfavourable to Russia), there 
has still been no voice of criticism in the national debate from the 
Russian government, particularly not from the most senior state 
officials. This approach is also backed by a large part of Russian 
expert circles, especially those linked to academic institutions 
involved in Chinese studies, and those from think-tanks which 
are believed to be linked to the Kremlin. Other actors have also 
joined this debate from time to time; for example, representatives 
of Russian big business, both private and state-owned. Depending 
on the interests they represent, they emphasise various aspects 
which make China an indispensable partner. However, regard-
less of these differences, some common key elements of the op-
timistic approach to the future development of Russian-Chinese 
relations can be distinguished. China’s significance for Russia is 
concentrated in two areas. Firstly, given its economic growth and 
potential, China is seen as a partner which could trigger economic 
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and political development in Russia itself. Secondly, co-operation 
with China is treated as an inevitable element of Moscow’s multi-
directional foreign policy. 
china as an economic opportunity for russia. In the first area 
of significance, the economies of the two countries are seen as 
mutually complementary, and the Chinese market is treated as 
an opportunity for the economic development of Russia itself. 
The most active supporters of establishing closer economic re-
lations with China in the debate include representatives of the 
government and big business, especially businesses operating 
in the raw materials sector27. A potential Russian-Chinese sym-
biosis, together with capitalising on the complementarity of the 
two economies, appears to be the best solution. Russia’s main ad-
vantage is its proximity to the Chinese market, which makes it 
more competitive in comparison to other, more distant suppliers. 
China is at the same time seen as a key element of the strategy to 
diversify Russian oil and gas exports, as well as a kind of gateway 
to the Asian market. Supporters of co-operation with China want 
real integration of the two economies, through investments or the 
creation of joint economic zones28.
Oleg Deripaska, an oligarch who is believed to have good con-
nections in the Kremlin, has described the Chinese market with 
great enthusiasm, stating that the two countries may not neces-
sarily forge a political partnership, but that an economic one is 
inevitable. In his opinion, co-operation with China (including the 
construction of water power plants in Siberia, which would gen-
erate electricity for the Chinese market) is a unique opportunity 
27 ‘Rossiya ne spravitsya’, op.cit.
28 Alyakrinskaya, Loginov, op.cit.; ‘Putin Says Russia Near China Deal on Sup-
plying Natural Gas’, Bloomberg, 11 October 2011 [in:] Johnson’s Russia List 
2011-183-28; Wang Xing, ‘Russia looks to resources’, China Daily, 5 September 
2011; Trenin, ‘True partners…’, p. 30; ‘Kitayskiye investitsii v DFO vozmozh-
ny, no tolko posle chastnykh rossiyskikh’, Allmedia, 6 July 2010, http://www.
allmedia.ru/newsitem.asp?id=879610. 
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for Russia to capitalise on the economic growth in Asia29. In the 
opinion of Artiom Volyniets, the head of the En+ Group raw mate-
rials and industrial holding, eastern Siberia could become the key 
supplier of raw materials to Asian markets, especially the Chinese 
market. 
The fact that China is seen as an example and a source of moderni-
sation for Russia is a new element in the Russian debate, and at 
the same time as the best reflection of the change which has taken 
place in bilateral relations during the past decade. Supporters of 
closer co-operation include Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr 
Zhukov and numerous experts who regard China as a potential 
source of investments and new technologies30. Experts from the 
Russian section of the Valdai Club, who have the reputation of be-
ing pro-Kremlin, have been making direct appeals for a Russian-
-Chinese partnership for modernisation. 
Representatives of the Russian Far Eastern regions, local govern-
ment members and experts alike, see China as a key factor which 
is necessary for the Russian Far East to bloom again and for Russia 
to join in regional (Asian) economic integration. The main element 
of this partnership should be a strategy of harmonic development 
of the two countries’ frontier regions. In this context, China’s 
role in developing Siberia and the Far East is estimated as poten-
tially very significant. Chinese investments are not perceived 
as a threat; rather, it is pointed out that they should be more in-
tense and more diversified. At the same time, the Far Eastern re-
gions blame Moscow for developing the co-operation too slowly, 
claiming that it is the central government which fears excessive 
dependence on China. The fact that the regional co-operation 
agenda is being implemented very slowly proves the existence of 
29 Allan Murray, ‘China Has Politics, Too’, Wall Street Journal, 21 November 
2011; Helen Power, ‘Oligarch to go dam building so Siberia can power China’, 
The Times, 17 June 2011.
30 ‘Rossiya ne spravitsya’, op.cit.; Lyubov Pronina, ‘Medvedev to Trade Energy 
for Investment on China Trip’, Bloomberg, 12 April 2011.
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a dispute between the central government and the Far Eastern 
regions. However, this is rarely manifested in public discourse. 
One of the few examples was a statement made by Aleksandr Baz-
henov, the head of the Far East Development Fund established in 
2011; he warned against orienting the entire development of the 
Far Eastern province towards China, saying that this means that 
the economy will continue to be based on raw materials instead 
of being developed in a more comprehensive way31. Furthermore, 
Russian experts admit that the level of Chinese investments in the 
Russian Far East remains low, and has not exceeded a billion dol-
lars. They also say that it would be easier to attract Chinese capital 
if the Russian side itself invested in the Far Eastern region, thus 
encouraging investors to move beyond the raw materials sector32. 
At the same time, unwillingness to open up to big Chinese capital 
is evident, even at the regional level, which is primarily an effect 
of the fear of competition. 
The approach to exporting arms to China is a symbol of the belief 
in the convergence of the two countries’ economic and political in-
terests. In this context, China’s approach to intellectual property 
rights and its genuine competition with Russia on other countries’ 
markets pose problems. On the one hand, the Chinese industry is 
accused of illegally copying arms purchased from Russia. Analysts 
opposing the government are especially critical of this, claiming 
that China is a bad partner which copies products and exposes the 
Russian arms industry to losses, and – furthermore – is beginning 
to compete with Russian on the markets of developing countries. 
On the other hand, supporters of co-operation see China as poten-
tially the largest purchaser of Russian weapons. Therefore, it is 
31 Howard Amos, ‘Far East Development Hinges on Branding and Diversity’, 
The Moscow Times, 21 November 2012.
32 ‘Kitai delayet iz Rossii…’; ‘Regional Stability through Harmonious Develop-
ment’…, op.cit., pp. 10-11; Fred Weir, ‘What Putin wants from China’, The Chris-
tian Science Monitor, 11 October 2011; ‘Kitayskiye investitsii v DFO’, op.cit. 
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emphasised that not too much stress should be laid on copyright, 
in the case of such a large customer33.
china as a foreign policy partner. China is also perceived as 
a key partner in the context of Russia’s foreign policy. Given the 
fact that Russia does not belong to any alliances (with the excep-
tion of the CSTO, where Russia plays the pivotal role), as well as 
the Kremlin’s multidirectional policy, co-operation with China is 
seen as an essential element for building up Russia’s position in 
the international order. Close relations with China are important 
from the strategic point of view, especially at the time when all the 
other key actors desire to bring themselves closer to China. The 
most important shared views which contribute to close Russian-
-Chinese co-operation are considered to be the following: the de-
sire to establish a multi-polar international order; opposition to 
the United States’ domination, which infringes upon the interests 
of Russian and China alike; and the dislike of the US interfering 
in their internal affairs. Nor does China’s development put Rus-
sia’s interests in jeopardy because, unlike the United States, China 
does not hold a hegemonic position in the global order34. In effect, 
Beijing insists that Washington should yield some of its position to 
it in the regional (Eastern Asian) and global order. China has un-
resolved territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam and India, but it 
has no such claims with regard to Russia.
In the opinion of those participants of the debate who see a con-
vergence of Russian and Chinese interests, Beijing is satisfied 
with its co-operation with Moscow. It provides a sort of ‘strategic 
base’ in both political and economic terms (for example, supplies 
of oil and gas). At the same time, given the complexity of China’s 
relations with Western countries, co-operation with Russia offers 
Beijing more room for manoeuvre. The greatest common political 
33 ‘Kitai prodolzhayet kopirovat’ rossiyskuyu voyennuyu techniku’, Voyennoye 
obozreniye, 9 June 2011, www.topwar.ru; Interfax, 9 November 2010.
34 Trenin, ‘True partners…’, p.10. ‘Rossiya ne spravitsya’, op.cit.; Razov, op.cit.
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challenge for both of these countries is the growing instability in 
international relations on both the global and regional scales35.
At the same time, regardless of the optimistic future visions of bi-
lateral relations, we may note that barriers to the development of 
relations between Moscow and Beijing do exist. One of the clear-
est signs of this is the fact that the option of bilateral alliance is 
no longer mentioned (or only very rarely) in the Russian debate 
on the future of relations with China. This primarily results from 
the growing inequality between the two countries which has been 
observed, and from the conclusion shared by Russian experts that 
China does not intend to involve itself in such an alliance. This 
does not mean withdrawal from searching for ways of forming 
an anti-Western coalition with China; however, what is now pro-
posed is rather a multilateral bloc, proposals for which are quite 
general, and are not being formed by the most influential expert 
circles36. Although China is not perceived as a potential ally, sup-
porters of close co-operation treat it as a key partner.
Even those who share the optimistic vision for the development of 
relations still cannot agree on the desirable level of co-operation be-
tween Russia and China in the post-Soviet area, especially as those 
countries which belong to the integration organisations established 
on Russia’s initiative in the post-Soviet area are also members of 
the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. Shortly before his visit 
to China in June 2012, President Putin explicitly expressed his sup-
port for closer co-operation between the Common Economic Space 
(which is to be transformed into the Eurasian Union) and the SCO37. 
35 Larin, ‘Rossiysko-kitaiskiye otnosheniya…’; Yuri Tavrovsky, ‘Konfutsiyu ne 
podkhodit khizhina diadi Toma’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 February 2010. ‘Re-
gional Stability through Harmonious Development…’, op.cit., p. 6.
36 Aleksandr Dugin has appealed for Russia to have China, India and the 
Islamic, Asian and Latin American countries ‘on its side’. See: ‘A yesli Putin 
vseryoz’, Argumenty i Fakty – Ne dai Boh, no. 5, 14-21 March 2012. However, 
even he cannot see the option of a bilateral or equal alliance with China. 
37 ‘Rossiya i Kitai: noviye gorizonty sotrudnichestva’, Renmin Ribao, 5 June 2012.
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According to some experts, economic co-operation and the creation 
of a single economic space should also be coordinated simultane-
ously as part of the SCO and the EurAsEC/CES, because if Russia 
restricted its actions only to the latter organisation, this would lead 
to serious competition with China. In turn, the Russian ministries 
of finance and economy would rather see economic co-operation 
being continued as part of the EurAsEC/Eurasian Union, and 
not within the SCO. This also indicates that the SCO is develop-
ing solely as a political organisation, although proposals to create 
economic and energy clubs within it have been made. An article 
published by Putin several days before his visit to China, in which 
he envisaged the creation of the Eurasian Union, was interpreted 
in exactly this light38.
Public opinion is inclined to share the optimistic vision, albeit 
cautiously; over the past decade, the number of respondents who 
support co-operation with China has increased from 22 to 34%, 
and the number of people who see China as one of the five Russia’s 
closest allies grew from 12% in 2005 to 16% in 2012. At the same 
time, 4% of respondents in the same polls indicated China as one 
of the five most hostile countries39.
2. The pessimistic vision: China as an ‘elder brother’
This optimistic vision for future bilateral relations contrasts 
strongly with the trend which sees the prospects for development 
of Russian-Chinese relations in negative terms. Representatives 
of this trend expect Russia to gradually become dependent on 
China, first economically and then politically. The actors who are 
most strongly engaged in this trend include politicians who are in 
opposition to the Kremlin (Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov are 
the most active in this area), as well as experts who are opposed 
to the government. 
38 Weir, op.cit.; Trenin, ‘True partners…’, p. 31.
39 These polls were conducted by the Levada Center (www.levada.ru). 
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russia’s increasing economic dependence on china. This trend 
in the debate is based on the fear of the political consequences of 
the existing economic model. The Russian economy is becom-
ing peripheral as compared not only to the developed countries 
but also to the developing ones, and co-operation with China is 
becoming more and more unilateral. As a consequence, Russia 
is increasingly incapable of withstanding China’s political and 
economic influence, which extends even to such routine inter-
nal procedures as the decision to close the Cherkizovo market40. 
According to those who adhere to the pessimistic vision for the 
development of bilateral relations, Russia will be completely de-
pendent on China in the future, and China could even take control 
of part of the Russian Federation’s territory. 
According to critics of the present direction of development, Chi-
na is primarily interested in Russian raw materials, and Russia 
is unable to turn this unfavourable trend around. At the most, it 
could participate, along with other countries which are rich in 
natural resources, in boosting the Chinese economy by supply-
ing raw materials to China. Even if China is uninterested in tak-
ing over Siberia and the Far East, the development projects it of-
fers are ‘semi-colonial’ in nature and, in the opinion of Russian 
experts, are reminiscent of those proposed to African countries. 
This view is becoming increasingly widespread, not only among 
the experts but also in the media. Opposition politicians and ex-
perts are especially critical regarding this issue; in their opinion, 
it is in China’s vital interest that political power in Russia remains 
in the hands of the people who have given it the natural resources 
of Siberia and the Far East so easily41.
According to those who oppose bringing Russia closer to Chi-
na, Russia’s room for manoeuvre is shrinking very rapidly, and 
40 Andrei P. Tsygankov, ‘Russia’s Tilt Toward China’, [in:] Johnson’s Russia List, 
#192, 19 October 2009.
41 Piontkovsky, ‘Kitainoye…’, op.cit.
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Moscow will find it increasingly difficult to reduce its ever greater 
dependence on Beijing. These fears are best summed up in the opin-
ion that a military conflict between Russia and China can be ruled 
out, but Russia will become China’s source of energy and raw mate-
rial supplies, and in the longer term, its ‘political younger brother’. 
Although China has not been aggressive towards Russia, and its ex-
pansion is focused on the basins of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 
Russia is still perceived as a source of raw materials, and China will 
make endeavours to obtain these using both moderate and (where 
necessary) harsher methods. According to most pessimistic visions 
from Russian observers, China is deliberately taking actions to 
subjugate Russia. Opposition analysts42 are among those who warn 
most frequently of the Chinese threat linked to the uneven poten-
tials of the two countries and Chinese military modernisation. In 
their opinion, China needs a vassal and not a strong partner; it does 
not respect Russian interests, is a tough negotiator, and Russia will 
have no other choice but to make concessions. 
The uncertain future of the russian far east. The fear about 
the future of the Russian Far East is especially strong. Those 
participants in the debate who see the growing power of China 
is a threat to Russia see this region, which borders on the north-
eastern Chinese provinces, as the first target in the expansion 
which Beijing is plotting. The lack of development programmes 
for the Far East, the inadequate defence potential and the lack 
of a migration regime and border protection are also sources of 
potential threats to Russia. It is also emphasised that China’s de-
velopment will also put ecological pressure on that region. In the 
opinion of those who tend to criticise Russian-Chinese co-opera-
tion, the Russian Far East will become in fact part of the Chinese 
economy within a decade. Similar fears have been expressed in 
the strategy devised by the Ministry of Regional Development for 
the Far East, Buryatia, the Zabaykalsky krai and Irkutsk oblast 
42 The most active participants of the debate are: Aleksandr Khramchikin, 
Aleksandr Sharavin and Andrei Piontkovsky.
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to be implemented by 2025. In the critics’ opinion, China is in-
vesting more in the Russian Far East than Russia does itself, al-
though the data is inaccurate and inconsistent. The media have 
also reported that China is allegedly forming special governing 
bodies manage these areas and investments. The need to restrict 
the influx of Chinese labour force so as to keep the Far East ‘Rus-
sian’ has also been emphasised; Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev 
made a similar statement in July 2012. However, one should be 
cautious in seeing this as a possible change in the stance Russian 
leaders have adopted; Medvedev is in a weak political position 
as a prime minister, and no suggestions of this kind were made 
when he was president. According to some experts, the character 
of the recently signed oil contract does indeed make the loss of the 
Far East inevitable. Experts speculate that should Russia wish to 
withdraw from this agreement, a major conflict with China could 
be expected43.
The trend which criticises about close co-operation between 
Russia and China is focused on the bilateral relations existing 
between these countries. We may also note the fear that Russia 
could become marginalised in the international arena by China’s 
development, and that Russian interests could be put in jeopardy. 
In the opinion of critics of close co-operation, Russia is lagging be-
hind China in the area of international affairs. The nature of con-
sultations between them is unilateral – Moscow asks for opinions, 
while Beijing fails to do the same44. The Russian interests which 
could be jeopardised in effect of change in Russian-Chinese rela-
tions include economic interests in developing countries (includ-
ing arms sales), influence in post-Soviet countries and interests in 
the Arctic. 
43 Arbatov, op.cit.; ‘Rossiya ne spravitsya’, op.cit.; Alyakrinskaya, Loginov, op.cit.; 
Piontkovsky, op.cit.; ‘Kitaitsy vkladyvayut v rossiyskiye regiony bolshe, chem 
Moskva’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 February 2011; Yuliya Latynina, ‘Rossiya – 
syrievoi pridatok Kitaya’, Yezhednevnyi Zhurnal, 18 June 2009.
44 Oleg Naumov, ‘Kitai i Rossiya – novyi etap ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichest-
va’, Orent-TV, 22 October 2011, http://ru-sps.livejournal.com/777658.html. 
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v. conclusIons
Moscow’s policy towards China is to a great extent a result of Rus-
sia’s relations with the West. The Kremlin has readily played the 
‘Chinese card’, by threatening to establish closer political relations 
with Beijing (especially in its dealings with the United States), or 
to redirect oil and gas exports (in dealings with the European Un-
ion). Seen in global terms, co-operation with China prevents Mos-
cow from being isolated by Western countries. The debate which 
is taking place in Russia may reveal the impact that the changes in 
the Russian-Chinese balance of power will have on Russia’s rela-
tions with the West. 
1. Russia is standing between the West and China
Russia’s relations with the West exist at many levels, and are 
a mix of rivalry and limited co-operation. Seen from the Russian 
political perspective, the West itself has several connotations, 
which function in parallel to one another. Firstly, the United 
States, which is treated as a power-seeking hegemony, a rival 
in the international arena and at the same time a point of refer-
ence. Secondly, the image of the West as a geopolitical bloc which 
is dominated by the USA and institutionalised in the form of 
NATO; a bloc which desires to impose its own vision of interna-
tional order upon the entire world, interferes with the internal 
affairs of individual countries, and is ready to launch a military 
intervention in order to protect its interests. Thirdly, a vision of 
the West divided into the United States, which demonstrates a re-
luctant attitude towards Russia, and Europe (represented by in-
dividual countries such as Germany, France and Italy), which is 
ready to co-operate with Russia. Fourthly, the West understood 
as a potential partner in a multi-polar world dominated by non-
Western countries. As a result of these various perceptions of the 
West among the Russian elites, sharp disputes over the US missile 
defence shield (which have come very close to confrontation) are 
accompanied by co-operation concerning Afghanistan (the most 
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recent element of which was allowing NATO to sue the transit air-
port in Ulyanovsk); and the dispute over methods of responding to 
the Arab Spring has been accompanied by initiatives for creating 
durable, institutionalised bonds with Europe in the form of a ‘Un-
ion of Europe’. This also has an impact on what seems to be a self-
contradictory perception of the West as both losing power on the 
international arena and simultaneously striving for hegemony.
At the same time, regardless of the aforementioned differences in 
the visions of the West among the Russian elites, Moscow’s policy 
is aimed at gaining strategic advantage and implementing certain 
interests with regard to Western countries. As a consequence, 
disputes at the practical level predominate in Russian-Western 
relations. In the case of the United States, these disputes concern 
strategic and geopolitical issues, and in the case of Europe, energy 
and security issues. 
The Russian debate in the aspect of the influence of relations with 
China on Moscow’s contacts with the West is focused on relations 
with the United States and the geopolitical dimension. Russia’s 
policy in Europe depends very little on the condition of its rela-
tions with China. In effect, most attention is focused on develop-
ing relations in the Russia-China-USA format, where the parties 
are looking for ways of arranging their mutual relations anew. 
This section of the debate is dominated by experts’ opinions; other 
actors have practically no influence on it. 
Some experts, especially those who hold critical views on the 
Kremlin’s foreign policy, are undermining the very existence of 
such a triangle, claiming that instead there is a tendency towards 
strengthening strategic relations between the US and China, 
where no room has been left for Russia. China is the primary ref-
erence point for the USA and vice versa. This gives rise to fears that 
Russia could become excluded from this new US-Chinese co-op-
eration. It has been said that the USA wants its bilateral relations 
with Beijing and Moscow to be better than relations between the 
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latter two. The USA’s so-called G-2 proposal was seen as an at-
tempt to loosen the relations between Russia and China, and to 
leave Russia outside the decision-making process45.
Even those experts who accept the existence of the Russia-China-
-USA triangle have no doubts that Russia is the weakest side. Due 
to this relative weakness, most of them have no illusions about 
the possibility of building any ‘triumvirate’ on the global scale. 
Through its close co-operation, Moscow has provided China with 
indirect strategic support, but it has no sufficient potential to act 
as a ‘balancing power’ between China and the USA. Moreover, ex-
perts from the Valdai Club believe that the race for Russia and its 
raw materials may even become a destabilising factor: “a stronger 
China will not pose any threat to Russia’s global or regional in-
terests”, but the lack of response from other actors to China’s ris-
ing position may upset global stability. Furthermore, it cannot be 
ruled out that Western powers and countries in this region will 
attempt to help Russia become a counterweight for China. Russia’s 
weaknesses and dilemmas in relations with the USA and China 
are most evident in Eastern Asia. One challenge is Russia’s inad-
equate economic and political engagement in the region’s affairs; 
Russia only plays a significant regional role in the military and 
strategic areas. Another challenge for Moscow may arise from 
tension in China’s contacts with the USA, Japan or India. For this 
reason, Russia should become involved in building a regional ar-
chitecture that would restrict US-Chinese rivalry46.
Experts agree that, given Moscow’s weakness, it should not de-
finitively take sides, so as not to turn itself into a ‘younger brother’ 
and not become subordinate to the interests of any other country. 
Russia has no other choice but to pursue a cautious policy of bal-
ance between the USA and China. The perfect situation is seen as 
45 Trenin, ‘True partners…’, pp. 10-11. ‘Rossiysko-kitaisky seminar…’, op.cit.
46 ‘Regional Stability through Harmonious Development…’, op.cit., pp. 14-15. 
Trenin, ‘Postimperium…’, p. 136.
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one where each party makes attempts to attract Russia, offering 
tangible benefits in exchange. 
2. The impact of the debate on the Russian policy
The consequences of changes in Russian-Chinese relations are 
still being evaluated in different ways in the Russian debate. 
However, it can be said that the government is among those who 
support close co-operation with China and see the Chinese devel-
opment in terms of opportunities rather than threats. In effect, 
those who are critical about bringing Russia closer to China have 
a limited impact on the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, the 
debate taking place in Russia indicates the extent to which chang-
es in Russian-Chinese relations are affecting Russian-Western re-
lations. 
a slight change in the perception of the West. The conviction 
that the success of China’s transformation is great and that this 
country is inevitably set to become a superpower, which predomi-
nates in the Russian debate, will affect the Russian elites’ percep-
tion of the West. Western countries are no longer seen as the only 
source of ideas for successful transformation and modernisation. 
As a consequence of recognising China as a source of modernisa-
tion in the areas of technology, finance and politics, Russia may 
find Western countries less and less appealing to it.
China’s strengthening international position is contributing to 
the increasingly popular conviction in the Russian debate that 
the West is weak and must share its influence in the existing in-
ternational order. In effect, the fascination with China which is 
visible in the debate is giving rise to increasingly negative percep-
tions of the Western countries. Furthermore, given the strongly 
divided opinions as to how much Russia is losing and how much it 
is gaining as a consequence of China’s development, it seems quite 
unlikely that the West, and above all the United States, will begin 
to be seen as a counterbalance to China which will therefore be 
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necessary for Moscow as a potential ally. The emergence of a new 
balance of power in Russian-Chinese relations has not brought 
any change in the perception of the role the West is playing.
The russian ‘no’ to an anti-chinese coalition. Russian-Chinese 
relations is a broadly discussed topic in the Western world. The 
view that China’s growing position poses a threat to Russia, which 
should therefore seek to move closer to the West, is regularly ex-
pressed. A great part of Russian researchers have criticised such 
rhetoric, and see such warnings against China as attempts to set 
Moscow and Beijing at odds. This approach has been especially 
strongly expressed by those who believe that Russia should con-
tinue its multi-vector foreign policy and who do not want it to have 
overly close ties with any power or bloc. In their opinion, Russia 
cannot allow either of these two scenarios: a choice between the 
USA and China, or joining the policy of holding back China. While 
accepting the option of establishing closer relations with the USA, 
and thus reinforcing Russia, they warn against even the slightest 
hint of Russia joining any initiative aimed at containing China47.
This view is shared by the Kremlin, which has ruled out joining 
any kind of ‘anti-Chinese coalition’ (the present US-India rela-
tions are an example of collaboration which is officially not tar-
geted against China). It is very unlikely that in the foreseeable 
future, Russia will back the United States in its policy aimed at 
limiting China’s influence and strengthening its own position in 
Eastern Asia. 
The weakness of the ‘chinese card’. Russia’s ability to use its co-
-operation with China in order to improve its position in dealings 
with the West remains low. The greatest impediments to this are 
its withdrawal from seeking a political and military alliance with 
47 Yevgeny Bazhanov, ‘Lutshe druzhit s Kitayem, a ne protiv nego’, Nezavisi-
maya Gazeta, 14 February 2011; Trenin, ‘True partners…’, p. 26; Igor Zevelev, 
‘Realizm v XXI veke’, Rossiya v globalnoi politike, 6/2012.
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China due to Beijing’s unwillingness; China’s rigid stance in nego-
tiations concerning bilateral co-operation, which is most strongly 
felt in issues concerning the energy sector; and the growing im-
balance in Russian-Chinese relations. The likelihood that Russia 
will be able to reverse the latter trend appears quite low. 
Supporters of co-operation have placed great emphasis on the 
need to use the existing close relations with China to stimulate 
economic growth in Russia, although they are far less likely to 
treat it as an instrument of pressure on Western countries. In ef-
fect, we should expect that in the longer term, China will use its 
co-operation with Russia to counterbalance Western influence. 
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